On the surface, February 8 was like any other day in Pakistan, marked by clear winter sky and earth warmed by the sun’s rays. In the political sphere, however, it was anything but mundane – it was a day full of unexpected twists and turns and several political upsets. February 8 was the day Pakistan held its general elections.
Millions of voters across Pakistan turned out to cast their votes. Before the elections, analysts and political commentators had predicted a sweeping victory for the PML-N, led by Nawaz Sharif. Sharif, who had returned three months earlier from a self-imposed exile in London to contest the elections, was widely regarded as the establishment’s favored candidate this time around. The return marked a dramatic change in his legal fortune – the corruption allegations that had dogged him for decades, eventually leading to his disqualification from contesting in the 2018 elections, were suddenly dropped. His main political rival, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan, was in disarray. Khan, currently in jail on over a hundred counts of corruption and an un-Islamic marriage, saw his party splintered and its leaders forced to contest elections as independents, without the well-known cricket bat symbol of the PTI.
Sharif had even prepared a victory speech for election night, expecting to declare himself the clear winner. However, as the results began to pour in, his bubble burst and the victory speech had to be delayed. When the polling stations closed at 5:00 pm, media outlets began announcing the unofficial results. A clear theme emerged – PTI-backed independent candidates were winning in most constituencies. This stunned analysts who had predicted an easy ascendancy to power for the army-backed Sharif. The PML-N, initially predicting it would secure 85 percent of the seats from Punjab, was barely managing to get 50 percent of the seats.
Throughout the day, there were reports of election irregularities. Polling stations closed prematurely or opened late, voters were denied the right to vote, and unknown, unofficial men were handling cases in women’s polling stations. Despite promises from the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) that cellular and internet services would not be shut down, they were. The ECP website mysteriously went offline late into the election evening. The counting of votes was excruciatingly slow. There was a widespread understanding among the people of Pakistan, both pre- and post-elections, that the powerful establishment would manipulate the results to favor its chosen candidates. As the country slept that night, several results were magically changed overnight, and candidates that had been trailing by tens of thousands of votes were now leading in the polls. As the results rolled out on Sunday, protests were already underway in major cities across Pakistan as candidates backed by the PTI alleged serious election-rigging.
When the dust settled on the election results, the PML-N emerged with 75 seats in the national assembly, trailing PTI-backed independent candidates by 20 seats. The other long-term party, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), won 54 seats. It is headed by Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the son of assassinated former female Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto.
In the victory speech that the PML-N had prepared for the election night, Nawaz Sharif was poised to declare his party’s clear triumph. However, as he stood before a passionate crowd of over 1500 supporters in Lahore on Friday, the substance of the speech had changed, from a pompous declaration of victory to a humble acknowledgement that the PML-N had failed to secure the seats it was so sure of. Addressing the crowd, Sharif revealed that he might explore alliances with other parties to establish a coalition government. Unsurprisingly, he did not mention PTI.
What Did the International Media Have to Say?
The attempts by the Pakistani establishment to sideline PTI and Imran Khan, both before and after the elections, did not go unnoticed. As voters headed to the polls, the international media kept a close watch on the unfolding situation. The coverage of the elections by global news outlets was painfully candid.
The British daily, The Guardian, suggested that the stifling of Khan and his supporters could lead to further turmoil and instability, urging Pakistan to “celebrate the voter revolt of 2024.” Bloombergechoed this sentiment, arguing that the Pakistani populace had grown weary of the dynastic politics of the Sharifs and Bhuttos. The New York Times noted that the victory of Khan and PTI had disrupted the longstanding political norms in Pakistan, where the military establishment maintains ultimate control, ruling through a more palatable civilian front while still pulling the strings from behind the scenes.
Time magazine was forthright in its coverage of the elections. In an article titled “Pakistan’s military used every trick to sideline Imran Khan – and failed. Now What?” the magazine contended that PTI supporters had been disenfranchised in the elections. France 24 was equally harsh in its coverage, stating that the elections revealed that the true wielder of power in Pakistan was not the ballot paper, but the military generals. The most forthright of all was the London-based The Economist, which argued in a piece titled “Confusion reigns in Pakistan’s rigged elections” that the general elections had demonstrated that the military generals had less control than they had assumed.
Despite the unexpected success of PTI-backed independent candidates, they now face a formidable challenge. Theoretically, they could unite to form a majority coalition government, but this seems unlikely in practice. There is no precedent for such a move in Pakistan, a country where political dynasties have held sway over the national assembly. The stage is now set for a period of uncertainty, as the PML-N, the PPP, and other parties scramble to form what promises to be a shaky coalition government. This new government will inherit an economy teetering on the brink of collapse and an inflation rate that has hit 30 percent.
Elections in Balochistan – Façade of Democracy?
The general elections in Pakistan, enveloped in widespread controversies, were notably subdued in Balochistan. This region, known for its turbulent socio-political landscape, underwent an election cycle marked by boycotts, attacks by armed groups, and a widespread rejection of the electoral process.
In the lead-up to the elections, the non-political Baloch nationalists and “pro-independence” armed groups called for a complete electoral boycott. These groups argue that the elections in Balochistan are a “farce” and a “sham”, orchestrated by the Pakistani state to further “consolidate and intensify its occupation of Balochistan.” They say that the elections cannot benefit the people of Balochistan, an “occupied region” where the free will of the people is disregarded. They maintain that participation in the elections merely legitimizes Pakistan’s “colonial control” over Balochistan, and, therefore, dissuade people from taking part in them.
The electoral period saw further complications due to a spate of armed attacks. As the election campaigns were in full swing, Baloch “pro-independence” groups launched several attacks on election-related activities, resulting in numerous casualties and significant material and financial damage. Notably the Baloch Raji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) – a coalition of several Baloch “pro-independence” groups – claimed responsibility for 161 attacks targeting Pakistani forces and election campaigns in the lead-up to election day. BRAS articulated their campaign as a demonstration of the Baloch nation’s resistance to subjugation, with a warning of escalated attacks against the “occupying” state.
Security concerns also significantly deterred public participation in the elections. In Gwadar, for instance, the deputy commissioner ordered the suspension of 81 government employees who were unavailable for duty on election day. In Quetta, the deputy commissioner issued a threat alert and urged political parties to suspend their campaigning activities for three days. Even on the day of the elections, voter turnout was at a record low ranging between three and five percent in many areas. In several major cities and divisions of Balochistan, people refrained from voting due to security threats, a lack of ECP personnel, delayed opening of polling stations, and ongoing attacks on polling stations by Baloch armed groups throughout the day.
However, a major factor contributing to the electoral boycott was the deep-seated resentment harbored by the Baloch populace towards the Pakistani elections. This sentiment was notably exacerbated by the authorities’ handling of Baloch protesters in Islamabad, which primarily involved women and children. As political parties and candidates were ramping up their election campaigns, two significant protests were taking place. One was led by Dr. Mahrang Baloch of the Baloch Yakjehti Committee, which began in Turbat, traversed through Quetta and other cities in Balochistan to Islamabad, where it continued for several weeks before returning to Quetta on January 26. The other protest was staged by traders at the Chaman border against the newly introduced visa regime.
These protests aimed to highlight the grievances of the Baloch and Pashtun ethnic groups but were met with marked indifference not only by the state but also the political parties participating in the parliamentary politics. This apparent neglect, particularly at a time when solidarity was expected, ultimately led many traditional supporters of these parties to abstain from the electoral process.
Election Day Turbulence in Balochistan Amid Armed Attacks and Public Rejection
The extent of the boycott became starkly evident on election day, as significant populace of Baloch-majority areas actively demonstrated their rejection of the electoral process. This was not only through non-participation but also via substantial protests. Notably, in Mand Tump, Hironk, and other locations within the Kech district, women and children vocally protested against alleged state oppression and disrupted the electoral process.
Polling stations were also stormed in Kech district, with ballot boxes and papers being destroyed. This display of dissent, far from being an isolated occurrence in the Kech district, resonated across various other districts, where protesters disrupted the election process and clashed with members of so-called “death squads” participating in the elections.
Baloch Nationalists and the Pakistani Elections
Baloch nationalists also demonstrated a resolute determination against Pakistan’s general elections. In the aftermath of the elections, Dr. Naseem Baloch, Chairman of the Baloch National Movement, said that the Baloch nation has demonstrated a strong resolve for “liberation” by consciously rejecting the Pakistani elections. He said that despite state’s coercive measures, including military force, the Baloch nation boycotted the elections, sending a clear message to Pakistan and the world that they refuse to participate in the “occupier’s forced electoral process.” He asserted that elections in Pakistan are a futile exercise and a mockery, consistently manipulated for military purposes. The BNM chairman said that Balochistan has been transformed into a military garrison and an extensive prison by the Pakistani army. The rejection of Pakistani elections by the Baloch people stands as yet another resounding referendum against Pakistani “occupation.”
The Baloch Students Organization Azad (BSO-Azad), a student-led “pro-independence” group, also joined the boycott of Pakistan’s general elections. The group launched a social media campaign under the hashtag #BalochBoycottElections2024, urging the people of Balochistan to abstain from voting. The group argued that elections in conflict-ridden regions like Balochistan hold no legal status globally and that the Baloch reject what the group termed as the “selection game” in Balochistan.
In a detailed statement, BSO-Azad claimed that the Baloch nation is acutely aware of the tactics employed by the Pakistani state. It alleged that the state nominates drug kingpins, leaders of death squads, and criminal nawabs and sardars to lead the provincial government, thereby giving a more acceptable face to its “colonial rule” over Balochistan. The group asserted that Balochistan is entirely under the control of the Pakistani military, and the people in parliament are merely a semblance of Baloch representation in the country’s political discourse, a facade created by the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies. BSO-Azad further accused the Pakistani state of committing genocide against the Baloch nation and claimed that the politicians and parties participating in the elections are equally complicit in this genocide.
Military Establishment, Mainstream Political Parties, and Rule of Feudal Lords
Baloch nationalists argue, not without reason, that the Pakistani state bolsters local sardars, nawabs, and feudal lords who show scant regard for the people of Balochistan, focusing instead on maximizing personal gain during their tenure. Since the dissolution of the One Unit system in the 1970s and the declaration of Balochistan as a separate province, eleven elections have taken place, excluding the most recent one. During this period, Balochistan has been governed by 24 elected and unelected chief ministers, most of whom have sought to align themselves with the federal government, with the notable exceptions of the governments of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti (1989-1990) and Akhtar Mengal (1997-1998).
Journalist Kiyya Baloch argues that this is one of many reasons why Balochistan, despite its copious mineral wealth, strategic location, and easy access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea, continues to lag behind. He asserts that the most crucial decisions affecting Balochistan and its people are not made in the Balochistan assembly, but in Islamabad, as the supposed representatives of the people would rather curry favor with the capital than fulfill their duty – representing the people of Balochistan.
He further explains that corruption is widespread in the political corridors of Balochistan and the law and order situation continues to worsen. This only reinforces the widely-held belief among the people of Pakistan that Balochistan’s nawabs and sardars are responsible for the challenges faced by the Baloch region and people. While it’s not that simple, Kiyya Baloch argues, there is some truth to the notion. Of the 24 chief ministers of Balochistan, only Quddus Bizenjo and Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch were exceptions who did not come from feudal or dynastic political backgrounds. However, they received backing from feudal ruling parties. The remaining chief ministers have all come from the families of feudal lords or tribal chieftains.
These feudal lords and tribal chieftains show little to no concern towards the people of Balochistan. As their popularity wanes, either the establishment or the mainstream political parties, such as the PML-N and the PPP, breathe new life into them. This was evident when Nawaz Sharif visited Quetta in mid-November and met with a majority of Balochistan’s 29 ‘electables’, ironically, most of whom were part of the PML-N government in 2013-2018. Several electables have already switched loyalties to the PPP and JUI-F, including former chief minister Nawab Aslam Raisani and Quddus Bizenjo. The Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), formed by a group of electables and considered the establishment’s “favorite son”, has effectively been dismantled and is now divided between the PML-N and the PPP.
Many of the political figures who joined Nawaz’s party were part of the PML-N government until 2018. When the Supreme Court disqualified the PML-N supremo in July 2017, these electables started switching loyalties, weakening the PML-N’s provincial government in Balochistan. Among other notable figures who met Nawaz in Quetta was Senate Chairman Sadiq Sanjrani and Abdul Rehman Khetran, a former provincial minister from the impoverished Barkhan district, who has been involved in several controversies. Despite these serious accusations, Khetran denied any role in murder cases and was later released.
Sardar Khetran, who has been a key figure in the PML-N, the PML-Q, the JUI-F, and BAP since the 1990s, has held significant portfolios in each of these parties. However, Barkhan district, his home region, remains mired in acute poverty and underdevelopment, with notably low literacy rates. The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) ranks Barkhan among the poorest regions in Balochistan. Khetran’s son, Sardarzada Inam Shah Khetran, accuses him of deliberately keeping his people impoverished and Barkhan underdeveloped to maintain control. So far, Khetran has been exempted from serious scrutiny, but the allegations against him underscore the need for mainstream political parties like the PML-N to carefully scrutinize who they bring into power.
Parliamentary Politics – The Antidote to Balochistan’s Woes?
On the other side of the political spectrum are those who advocate for the increasing need for parliamentary politics in Balochistan. These individuals, including respected Baloch journalist Malik Siraj Akbar, argue that parliamentary politics is the only way out of poverty and instability for the people of Balochistan. Akbar, writing for an online news outlet, championed the increased political participation of charismatic and popular Baloch leaders, such as Mahrang Baloch, to dismantle Balochistan’s corrupt political elite. He argued that this would transfer control of the Balochistan Assembly from the elites to a new generation of leaders with high public trust and uncompromised integrity.
Akbar acknowledges the dwindling trust in parliamentary politics in Balochistan but insists that encouraging Baloch youth to vote has become taboo. Akbar argues that leaders like Mahrang Baloch should participate in parliamentary politics and seize control from the hands of the corrupt political elite. He says that despite the animosity, the Baloch and Islamabad will have to deal with each other in the foreseeable future. “There is no simple way to evade this deadlock”, he says. He says this approach warrants reconsideration. Institutions play a key role in shaping society, which is why anti-establishment leaders like Mohsin Dawar and Ali Wazir continue to contest in elections. But Akbar doesn’t mention how Ali wazir was put in jail in “bogus” cases and Mohsin Dawar was attacked twice where once he was shot during a protest and sevral other PTM leaders faced a crackdown allegedly by the military establishment and police, including PTM chief Manzoor Pahteen being arrested and kept incommunicado. All these aforementioned leaders have been barred from entering Balochistan and participating in Baloch protests on multiple occasions.
The aftermath of the Pakistani general elections in Balochistan — marked by allegations of widespread manipulation favoring those aligned with the ruling elite — casts a shadow over the optimistic view that parliamentary politics could be a panacea for Balochistan’s problems. Major parliamentary political parties in Balochistan, including the Balochistan National Party Mengal (BNP-Mengal), the National Party (NP), the Pashtukhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), and Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) have alleged that the Pakistani military and intelligence agencies “selected” their preferred candidates, disregarding the public mandate.
In light of these developments, it becomes clear that the solution to Balochistan’s issues extends beyond the scope of parliamentary politics. While some advocates see increased political participation as a way to address the region’s problems, Baloch nationalists, dismissing the elections as a “farce”, argue that such processes merely serve to legitimize Pakistan’s “occupation” of Balochistan. This unfolding scenario suggests that the recent elections may indeed validate the nationalists’ view that the Pakistani Parliament is not a viable solution to the Baloch problem.