Pakistan is reportedly looking to attract U.S. investment for a new port in Balochistan, in a bid to diversify foreign partnerships in a strategically sensitive region long dominated by Chinese infrastructure projects.
Advisers to Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir have reportedly floated a plan to U.S. officials to build and operate a terminal in Pasni, a port town in the Gwadar district on the Arabian Sea, according to a Financial Times report. The proposal would aim to facilitate access to Pakistan’s critical mineral deposits – such as copper and antimony – while excluding use of the port for direct U.S. military basing. A new rail link would tie the port to mineral-rich areas inland.
Military-linked advisers suggested to American investors that Pasni could serve as a new strategic hub on the Arabian Sea, positioned as an alternative to China-run Gwadar. Pasni lies about 70 miles from Gwadar and roughly 100 miles from the Iranian border, giving it a geographically significant location.
The plan is not yet official government policy, but was reportedly shared with Field Marshal Munir ahead of his September meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, held alongside Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistani and U.S. officials have not publicly confirmed the proposal.
Gwadar port – built under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – occupies a central role in China’s ambition for regional connectivity. Chinese firms control operational rights at Gwadar. Over time, Gwadar has become a frequent target of attacks by Baloch “pro-independence” groups, who argue that CPEC projects exploit Balochistan’s resources without benefiting local communities.
For instance, in March 2024, the Baloch Liberation Army’s (BLA) Majeed Brigade attacked the Gwadar Port Authority complex, resulting in several deaths. The Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility, framing the attack as a message to foreign investors. In other incidents, convoys of Chinese workers and infrastructure tied to CPEC have come under fire in Balochistan.
Local concerns, however, are already surfacing. For years, residents in Gwadar and surrounding districts have accused federal authorities and the military of monopolising resources of Balochistan without delivering jobs, healthcare, or basic services to local communities. Political and social activists have warned that if decisions on Pasni are taken in closed-door meetings driven by foreign interests, the people of Balochistan will once again be ignored.
Critics say many CPEC-linked projects have exacerbated local grievances: limited land compensation, job shortfalls, and displacement of communities have fuelled protests in Gwadar and beyond. In 2024, a large protest in Gwadar was triggered by arrests of Baloch activists and demands over resource rights.
Those grievances often underlie the narrative of the Baloch nationalists. Baloch armed groups portray Gwadar and related CPEC projects as instruments of external exploitation that deprive the Baloch people of their rightful share of natural wealth.
From Islamabad’s perspective, inviting U.S. participation in Pasni could provide multiple gains: balancing China’s pre-eminence in Balochistan, securing alternate export routes, and attracting development capital. The plan reportedly projects a cost of about $1.2 billion, combining Pakistani funding and U.S.-backed development finance. The organisers emphasize that the port would not host U.S. bases, making it more palatable domestically and regionally.
But the proposal carries significant challenges. Security in Balochistan is unstable. Attacks by the Baloch “pro-independence” groups on CPEC projects have increased, complicating investor sentiment. Critics may view the shift toward U.S. involvement as a geopolitical pivot, potentially straining ties with China. Moreover, local resistance is likely: the Baloch social and political elite have often opposed major infrastructure projects unless accompanied by meaningful resource sharing and political inclusion.
So far, neither the U.S. nor the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs has verified the plan. Analysts caution that turning a proposal into reality will require institutional will, security guarantees, and credible mechanisms to address local concerns.
Pakistan’s overture to the U.S. over a new port in Pasni underscores evolving geopolitics in South Asia, where balancing Chinese influence is becoming a priority in Islamabad’s calculus. But the shadow of Gwadar remains: symbolically and materially linked to Baloch resistance, Chinese investment, and deep-seated discontent over resource control. Whether the Pasni port proposal gains traction will depend not just on capital flows, but on the ability to manage security, local grievances, and strategic rivalry.
Although no formal U.S. response or Pakistani government announcement has yet been made, the report has reignited debate about Balochistan’s resources and the geopolitical rivalries playing out along its coastline. The future of the Pasni plan will depend not only on foreign capital but also on whether Islamabad can address the longstanding demands of Baloch communities for inclusion and equitable development, not to mention the ongoing independence movement and pro-independence forces in Balochistan.